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SEE NO EVIL, HEAR NO EVIL, SPEAK NO EVIL: AN ARGUMENT 
FOR A JURY DETERMINATION OF THE ENMUND/TISON 
CULPABILITY FACTORS IN CAPITAL FELONY MURDER CASES 
INTRODUCTION 
“[D]eath is different.”1  When used to punish, death taps society’s most 
primal urges.  It is meant to be a deterrent for potential offenders, triggering in 
them the innate reflex for self-preservation.  For society, it is meant to feed the 
primal desire for retribution.  For these very reasons, it is often claimed that 
death is only reserved for the worst of the worst. 
However, in trying to ensure that the above axioms remain true, courts 
have struggled.2  Most capital murder prosecutions proceed in at least two 
phases: a guilt phase and a sentencing/penalty phase.3  During the guilt phase, 
the Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to a jury determination of every fact 
necessary to establish the elements of the offense with which he is charged.4  
In the sentencing phase, the judge or the jury weighs aggravating factors—
facts or circumstances that, if found, militate for a harsher punishment—
against mitigating factors—circumstances which call for a more lenient 
punishment—to determine the appropriate sentence for the defendant.5  Until 
recently, the Supreme Court has held that the defendant does not have a 
constitutional right to a jury determination of sentencing factors in the 
sentencing phase.6  In other words, Sixth Amendment rights that applied to 
factual determinations in the guilt phase had not been constitutionally required 
for factual determinations traditionally made in the penalty phase.7  As capital 
criminal prosecutions developed, a clear line between the fact finding in the 
guilt phase and the fact finding in the sentencing phase crystallized.8 
 
 1. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). 
 2. Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
475, 476 (2005). 
 3. See e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (holding that a bifurcated criminal proceeding did 
satisfy constitutional concerns). 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speed and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . . ”) 
 5. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984). 
 6. Id.; see also Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 385–86 (1986). 
 7. Cabana, 474 U.S. at 385–86. 
 8. John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 1968 (2005). 
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Today, the border between guilt phase fact finding and penalty phase fact 
finding no longer exists.  In a series of cases, the Supreme Court broadened the 
scope of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury and has 
applied it to facts traditionally considered sentencing factors.9  In Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, the Court held that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”10  Labeling a fact as a “sentencing factor” 
no longer determines whether the defendant is entitled to a jury determination 
of that fact.  The Court stated that the relevant inquiry as to whether a fact 
increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum “is not one of form, but of 
effect.”11  If the finding of a fact has the effect of increasing the penalty 
beyond the statutory maximum, it must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt, regardless of whether it is found in the guilt phase or the sentencing 
phase.12 
Soon after the court established the Apprendi rule, it applied it to the 
question of whether statutory aggravating circumstances, which made capital 
defendants eligible for the death penalty in capital cases and were typically 
considered as sentencing factors, were required by the Sixth Amendment to be 
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.13  Reiterating its holding in 
Apprendi, the Court in Ring v. Arizona held that such aggravating factors must 
be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of whether the state 
labeled such factors as sentencing factors or elements of an offense.14 
But the scope of the holding in Ring was unclear.  Exactly which facts did 
it cover?  What about facts that proved a defendant’s culpability?  In Tison v. 
Arizona, the Supreme Court determined that in capital cases where the 
defendant was not the “triggerman,” a finding that the defendant either 
intended to kill or that the defendant was a major participant in the felony and 
demonstrated a reckless indifference to human life was required before the 
death penalty could be imposed upon the defendant.15  If such a finding was 
not made, then the imposition of the death penalty violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against grossly disproportionate punishment.16  This 
 
 9. Cunningham v. California, 127 S.Ct. 856 (2007); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 
(2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 10. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 11. Id. at 494. 
 12. Id. at 490. 
 13. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 597 (2002). 
 14. Id. at 609. 
 15. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157–58 (1986). 
 16. Id.; see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982).  “The Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment is directed, in part, ‘against all punishments which 
by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged.’”  Id. 
(quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910)). 
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holding substantially broadened the Court’s previous rule, set forth in Enmund 
v. Florida, that a defendant who was not the actual killer could not be 
sentenced to death absent a finding that the defendant either attempted to kill, 
intended that a killing take place, or contemplated that lethal force would be 
employed.17  For the purposes of this note, the Enmund/Tison culpability 
factors are the findings that (1) a felony-murder non-triggerman defendant 
either intended or attempted to kill, or (2) was a major participant in the 
underlying felony and displayed a reckless disregard for human life. 
Since the Ring decision in 2002, lower courts have ruled that the Sixth 
Amendment principles established in Apprendi and Ring do not require that a 
jury make Eighth Amendment Enmund/Tison findings.18  In making these 
holdings, the lower courts are mistaken in four respects: 1) the holdings 
mischaracterize the function of the Enmund/Tison findings; 2) the lower courts 
fail to recognize the vital role of the jury in deciding punishments based on a 
retributive theory of punishment; 3) the lower courts fail to recognize that the 
historical rationale on which Apprendi and Ring are based applies to the 
Enmund/Tison findings; and 4) the support the lower courts draw from the pre-
Apprendi case, Cabana v. Bullock, is misplaced in light of the developments of 
the Apprendi line of cases. 
This Comment argues that in light of the Supreme Court decisions in 
Apprendi and its progeny, the Enmund/Tison culpability findings for non-
triggermen felony murderers must be made by a jury and found beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  To establish this argument, Part I of this Comment 
examines the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis in the context of 
capital punishment and how it serves as the basis for the Enmund and Tison 
decisions.  Part II then examines the broadening effect the Apprendi line of 
cases had on a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.  Part III 
examines the lower court opinions which have declined to apply the 
Apprendi/Ring rule to the Enmund/Tison findings.  Finally, Part IV critiques 
the lower court opinions and establishes that the Eighth Amendment 
proportionality analysis and the reasoning in the Apprendi line of cases 
requires that the Enmund/Tison findings must be made by a jury and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
 17. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797. 
 18. Arizona v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 944 (Ariz. 2003) (en banc); Brown v. State of Oklahoma, 
67 P.3d 917, 920 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003); Harlow v. State of Wyoming, 70 P.3d 179, 204 (Wyo. 
2003) (where a jury did not make the requisite Enmund/Tison findings, the Wyoming Supreme 
Court reviewed the case record and found that the defendant was a major participant in the 
murder and acted with reckless indifference to human life). 
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I.  EIGHTH AMENDMENT CAPITAL JURISPRUDENCE: CULPABILITY AND JUST 
DESSERTS 
Although capital punishment has a long history at common law, modern-
day capital punishment jurisprudence began in 1972 with Furman v. 
Georgia.19  In five separate concurring opinions,20 the Court struck down 
Georgia’s death penalty law as violating the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment because the decision of who should 
receive death penalty was left to the unguided discretion of the jury, which 
created the risk that it was applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner.21  As 
a result, the reasoning in Furman invalidated all then existing state death 
penalty statutes.22 
Cases after Furman established two principles as constitutional 
requirements for the imposition of the death penalty: (1) death penalty statutes 
must guard against arbitrariness by sufficiently guiding the sentencer’s 
discretion;23 (2) the death penalty may not be imposed if it is 
disproportionately excessive in light of the specific circumstances of the 
crime.24  The proportionality analysis was clarified in Coker v. Georgia.25  The 
Court stated that the death penalty is disproportionate, and therefore 
unconstitutional, if it “(1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable 
goals of punishment;26 . . .  or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of 
the crime.”27  The underlying principle to both inquiries in the proportionality 
analysis (and the Eighth Amendment generally) is that “the fundamental 
respect for humanity” must be maintained.28  The proportionality test is 
 
 19. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 333 (1972) (“Capital punishment has been used to 
penalize various forms of conduct by members of society since the beginnings of civilization.”). 
 20. See generally, id. at 240 (Douglas, J., Brennan, J., Stewart, J., White, J., Marshall, J. 
concurring) 
 21. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (stating “there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing 
the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”); JOSHUA 
DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 314-15 (West Group 2d ed. 1999). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196–97 (1976) (upholding Georgia’s statutory 
aggravating factors); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Ultimate Authority on the Ultimate Punishment: 
The Requisite Role of the Jury in Capital Sentencing, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (2003). 
 24. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187, 206. 
 25. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
 26. The two most common goals are retribution, which focuses on the defendant’s 
culpability to determine the severity of the punishment, and deterrence.  See infra Part IV.2.   
 27. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (holding the imposition death penalty as grossly disproportionate 
to the crime of rape). 
 28. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (striking down North Carolina’s 
mandatory death sentencing statute); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604–05 (striking down 
Ohio’s statute which precluded the sentencer from considering mitigating factors at sentencing; 
because “the imposition of death . . . is so profoundly different from all other penalties[,] . . . [t]he 
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satisfied when the sentencer properly considers the “particularized nature of 
the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant.”29  
The rationale underlying both the Enmund and Tison decisions was based on 
these proportionality principles.30 
A. Capital Punishment and Felony Murder 
Both Enmund and Tison were felony murder cases.31  At common law, the 
felony murder rule provides that one who kills another during the course of a 
felony or attempted commission of a felony is guilty of murder.32  By 
transferring a defendant’s intent to commit the felony to satisfy the malice 
element of murder, the doctrine creates strict liability for deaths that occur 
during the course of a felony.33  Liability also extends to accomplices to the 
commission of felonies who may have not actually killed the victim.34  The 
underlying principle for this broad reach of liability is the fact that the death is 
directly linked to the felony and would not have occurred without it.35  
Accordingly, because non-triggerman felony murder defendants are held liable 
for murder, they are exposed to the same punishments as premeditated 
murders.36 
B. Enmund v. Florida: No Intent, No Death 
In 1982, in Enmund v. Florida, the Supreme Court addressed whether the 
Eighth Amendment prohibited imposition of the death penalty on non-
triggermen defendants who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill.37  The 
Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against grossly 
disproportionate punishment precluded imposition of the death penalty on a 
defendant convicted of first-degree felony murder where no finding was made 
that the defendant killed or intend to kill.38 
 
need for treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of 
the individual is far more important than in non capital cases.”). 
 29. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206.  The jury could “consider any aggravating or mitigating 
circumstance, [but it had to] find and identify at least one aggravating factor before it may impose 
a penalty of death.”  Id. 
 30. See infra Part I. 2–3. 
 31. See generally Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 
(1987). 
 32. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 515 (Lexis Publishing 3d ed. 
2001). 
 33. Id.; Lily Kling, Constitutionalizing the Death Penalty for Accomplices to Felony 
Murder, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 463, 464 (1988). 
 34. DRESSLER, supra note 32, at 516. 
 35. Kling, supra note 33, at 464. 
 36. DRESSLER, supra note 32, at 515. 
 37. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 787 (1982). 
 38. Id. at 797. 
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In Enmund, the defendant was the getaway driver in a double homicide 
armed robbery.39  He was neither present when the plan to rob the victims was 
hatched nor when the actual killings took place.40  Nonetheless, the defendant 
was convicted of first degree felony murder under a Florida statute that 
required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was “actually 
present and was actively aiding and abetting the robbery or attempted robbery, 
and that the unlawful killing occurred in the perpetration of or in the attempted 
perpetration of the robbery.”41 
To determine whether Enmund’s death sentence violated the Eighth 
Amendment, the Court looked at legislative judgments and jury decisions to 
ascertain the evolving standards of decency that establish what is cruel and 
unusual punishment.42  The Court found that only eight of the thirty-eight 
states that permitted the death penalty allowed for its imposition solely for the 
defendant’s participation in a robbery during which a murder was committed.43  
The Court also found that out of the 362 executions since 1954, only six were 
non-triggermen felony murderers.44  A survey of the nation’s death row 
population provided further evidence that juries rejected imposing the death 
penalty on non-triggerman defendants who did not participate in either the 
planning of or the actual killings.45  Looking at this data, the Court found that 
society had come to reject the imposition of the death penalty for non-
triggermen felony murderers who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to 
kill.46 
The other factor the Court weighed in determining if the imposition of the 
death penalty was disproportionate for non-triggerman defendants was the 
individual defendant’s culpability or “moral guilt.”47  For the imposition of the 
death penalty to pass the Eighth Amendment bar, the sentencer must grant 
individualized consideration to the relevant facts and character of the 
offender.48  The Court found that “Enmund did not kill or intend to kill and 
thus his culpability [was] plainly different from that of the robbers who killed; 
yet the state treated them alike.”49  The State, through the statute, was not 
allowed to attribute the culpability of the actual killers to Enmund for the 
 
 39. Id. at 784. 
 40. Id. at 786. 
 41. Id. at 785. 
 42. Id. at 788–94. 
 43. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 792. 
 44. Id. at 794–95. 
 45. Id. at 795. 
 46. Id. at 794. 
 47. Id. at 798. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798. 
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purpose of implementing the death penalty.50  Because Enmund lacked the 
intent to kill and did not consider that lethal force would be used during the 
crime, the Court found that the threat of the death penalty could not be a proper 
deterrent if the defendant did not contemplate that it would result from his 
actions.51  Likewise, because Enmund did not possess the heightened 
culpability necessary of one who actually killed or intended to kill, executing 
Enmund would not have “measurably contribute[d] to the retributive end of 
ensuring that the criminal gets his just deserts.”52 
In the language of Corker, the Court found that putting Enmund to death 
made no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and was 
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.53  The result was that the 
death penalty could not be imposed on a non-triggerman felony murder 
defendant absent a finding that the defendant in fact killed, attempted to kill, or 
intended that a killing take place.54 
The Court’s ruling in Enmund did little in terms of giving guidance to how 
such findings should be made.  A case with an identical fact pattern to Enmund 
would be easily decided, but the question of what facts indicated an intent or 
knowledge that lethal force would be used remained unanswered.  Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent in Enmund predicted this confusion because the ruling 
made “intent a matter of federal constitutional law, requiring [the] Court both 
to review highly subjective definitional problems customarily left to state 
criminal law and to develop an Eighth Amendment meaning of intent.”55 
C. Tison v. Arizona: Recklessness Substitutes for Intent 
Nearly four years later, the Court revisited its ruling in Enmund in Tison v. 
Arizona.56  In Tison, the defendants were convicted of first-degree felony 
murder after aiding family members escape from jail and murdering innocent 
passers-by during the course of the escape.57  The Court held that although 
they did not kill or intend to kill, a finding that the defendants were major 
participants in the felony and that they exhibited a reckless indifference to 
human life satisfied the Enmund culpability requirement.58 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 799. 
 52. Id. at 800–01. 
 53. See supra text accompanying notes 27–28. 
 54. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801. 
 55. Id. at 825 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  This criticism applies equally to her decision in 
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), where the term “reckless” could be substituted for the 
term “intent.” 
 56. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 137 (1987). 
 57. Id. at 141–42. 
 58. Id. at 158. 
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The Court noted that Enmund dealt only with two distinct poles in the 
spectrum of felony murder cases.59  On one end were those defendants who 
were only minor actors and not on the scene and who did not intend to kill and 
to whom no culpable mental state could be imputed.60  On the opposite 
extreme were the felony murderers; those who actually killed, attempted to 
kill, or intended to kill.61  In Tison, the Court narrowed the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition on the imposition of the death penalty by expanding the scope of 
the Enmund culpability factors to include a fourth category of defendants—
those who were major participants in the underlying felony and manifested a 
reckless indifference to human life.62 
The Court performed a similar analysis to that in Enmund and found that 
only eleven states did not allow the imposition of the death penalty for a 
defendant who was a major participant in the underlying felony and exhibited 
extreme recklessness.63  More importantly, the Court reaffirmed the 
importance of an individualized determination of culpability by determining 
the severity of the punishment to be imposed on an offender. 64  In discussing 
the individualized determination of the defendants in Tison, the Court nodded 
to the trial court’s determination that the defendants’ participation in the crimes 
was “substantial.”65  The Court pointed out that the defendants were actively 
involved in the elements of the kidnapping and robbery and that they were both 
present when the victims were killed.66 
This time, as opposed to Edmund, the individualized examination of the 
defendants’ culpability resulted in a different conclusion as to whether putting 
the defendants to death contributed to an acceptable goal of punishment.  The 
Court found that executing a defendant who manifested a reckless disregard for 
human life, a highly culpable mental state, did contribute to the retributive goal 
of “ensuring that a criminal gets his just deserts.”67 
Enmund and Tison established the required findings that a state must make 
before imposing death penalty on a non-triggerman felony murder defendant.68  
The Eighth Amendment does not bar the imposition of the death penalty on 
non-triggermen felony murder defendants who actually killed, attempted to 
kill, or intended to kill, or on those who were major participants in the 
 
 59. Id. at 149. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 150. 
 62. Tison, 481 U.S. at 158. 
 63. Id. at 154. 
 64. Id. at 156. 
 65. Id. at 158. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. at 149, 157. 
 68. See generally Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458, U.S. 782 
(1982). 
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underlying felony and whose conduct exhibited reckless indifference to human 
life. 69  However, in neither case did the Court establish exactly who must 
make the findings.  Was a defendant entitled to a jury to make these findings?  
Could the trial court make these findings? 
II.  SIXTH AMENDMENT CAPITAL JURISPRUDENCE: ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE 
VS. SENTENCING FACTORS 
The Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury in conjunction with the Due 
Process Clause “entitle[s] a criminal defendant ‘to a jury determination that 
[he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a 
reasonable doubt.’”70  Before the decisions in Apprendi and Ring, this 
constitutional protection was confined to the guilt phase of capital 
prosecutions.  Despite recognizing that capital sentencing resembles the guilt 
phase of a trial in some respects,71 the Court held that the Sixth Amendment 
right to a trial by jury did not extend into the capital sentencing phase of a 
prosecution.72  Thus, this distinction between the guilt phase and sentencing 
phase had significant consequences as to what facts a legislature designated as 
elements of the offense and which were merely sentencing factors.  Elements 
of the offense had to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; sentencing 
factors did not.73  Moreover, the Court recognized that states had the power 
and the right to define those substantive elements of the offense which had to 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.74  In the capital criminal proceeding 
Walton v. Arizona, the Court demonstrated the same deference to the states’ 
power to define elements of an offense by concluding that the Constitution did 
not require that the State denominate aggravating circumstances as elements of 
a capital murder offense.75  Apprendi, however, ushered in a new era where the 
 
 69. Tison, 481 U.S. at 158; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801. 
 70. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 
515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)). 
 71. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 458 (1984) (“‘[E]mbarrassment, expense and ordeal’ . 
. .  faced by a defendant at the penalty phase of a . . . capital murder trial . . . are at least 
equivalent to that faced by any defendant at the guilt phase of a criminal trial . . . .”) (quoting 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957)). 
 72. Id. at 459 (“[A] capital sentencing proceeding involves the same fundamental issue 
involved in any other sentencing proceeding—a determination of the appropriate punishment to 
be imposed on an individual.  The Sixth Amendment never has been thought to guarantee a right 
to a jury determination of that issue.”). 
 73. Id. 
 74. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 US. 79, 85 (1986) (“[I]n determining what facts must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt the state legislature's definition of the elements of the offense 
is usually dispositive . . . .”). 
 75. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990) (holding that as sentencing factors, the 
aggravating circumstances had to be found by a jury). 
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traditional distinction between the guilt phase and the sentencing phase is no 
longer valid. 
A. Apprendi v. New Jersey: Facts Without Borders 
In 2000, the ground shifted.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. 
New Jersey76 held “that any fact [other than a prior conviction] that increases 
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”77  In Apprendi, 
the defendant pled guilty to two counts of second degree possession of a 
firearm and one count of third degree possession of an antipersonnel 
explosive.78  During a post conviction hearing, the prosecutor moved to 
increase Apprendi’s sentence based on New Jersey’s statutory hate crime 
sentence enhancer.79  The statute defined a hate crime as one where the 
“defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an 
individual or group of individuals because of race . . . .”80 
The State argued that the judge could impose the increased sentence 
because the hate crime enhancement was a sentencing factor, not an element of 
the underlying offense81 and that the Sixth Amendment only applied to the 
facts necessary to establish guilt.82  Thus, once the jury returned a verdict of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge could then impose a sentence 
according to his discretion.83 
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens rejected the State’s argument by 
examining the historical context out of which the Sixth Amendment arose.84  
The principle that a criminal defendant is entitled to “a jury determination that 
[he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a 
reasonable doubt” reaches back centuries into the common law.85  Citing 
Justice Story, Justice Stevens paid homage to the right to a trial by jury as a 
“‘guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers,’ and 
‘the great bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties.’”86 
Additionally, Justice Stevens noted that at the founding of the nation there 
was no distinction between an “element” of an offense and a “sentencing 
 
 76. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 77. Id. at 490. 
 78. Id. at 469–70. 
 79. Id. at 470. 
 80. Id. at 468–69. 
 81. Id. at 471–72. 
 82. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466. 
 83. Id. at 481. 
 84. Id. at 476–85. 
 85. Id. at 477 (quoting U.S. v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 519 (1995)). 
 86. Id. (quoting J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 
540–41 (4th ed. 1873)). 
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factor.”87  The jury was charged with finding “all of the facts and 
circumstances which constitute the offense.”88  Because “[t]he substantive 
criminal law tended to be sanction-specific,” once the verdict was entered, the 
judge had little discretion in imposing the sentence required by law.89 
Due process cases that preceded and presaged Apprendi were also essential 
to the rationale underlying the Apprendi rule.90  The Court stated that the due 
process “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” protections established in In re 
Winship91 extended, “to some degree, ‘to determinations that [go] not to a 
defendant’s guilt or innocence, but simply to the length of his sentence.”92  A 
state could not avoid such protections by “redefining the elements that 
constitute different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely on 
the extent of punishment.”93 
Turning to the New Jersey Statute, the Court found that the hate-crime 
statute exposed a defendant convicted of a second degree weapons offense, to 
the same punishment as a first-degree weapons offense.94  The decision to 
trigger the New Jersey statutory hate crime sentence enhancer was made by a 
judge after he found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Apprendi 
unlawfully possessed a weapon for the purpose of intimidating the victim 
based on the victim’s race.95 
Because the hate crime statute called for an inquiry into Apprendi’s mens 
rea in order to justify sentence enhancement, the Court noted that a 
“defendant’s intent in committing a crime is . . . as close as one might hope to 
come to a core criminal offense ‘element.’”96  To determine whether a fact fell 
within the traditional jurisdiction of a jury, the question “is one not of form, 
but of effect—does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater 
punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?”97  If yes, then 
such a finding must be made by a jury and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.98 
 
 87. Id. at 478. 
 88. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478 (quoting JOHN FREDERICK ARCHBOLD, PLEADING AND 
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 44 (15th ed. 1862)). 
 89. Id. at 479. 
 90. Id. at 484–87. 
 91. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding “that the Due Process Clause protects 
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”). 
 92. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484 (citing Alamendarez-Torres v. U.S., 523 U.S. 224, 251 
(1998)(Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 93. Id. at 485 (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 579, 698 (1976)). 
 94. Id. at 491. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 493. 
 97. Id. at 494. 
 98. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). 
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B. Ring v. Arizona: The Eighth Amendment and Sixth Amendment 
Confluence 
The ruling in Apprendi was no minor shift in preserving the role of the jury 
in criminal procedure.  In Ring v. Arizona,99 the Court applied the new 
Apprendi rule to capital crimes.  The Court overruled Walton v. Arizona100 and 
held that Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme, which required a judge 
determine the existence of aggravating factors required to impose the death 
sentence, violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right that any fact 
increasing the penalty beyond the statutory maximum be found by jury beyond 
a reasonable doubt.101 
On November 28, 1994, Timothy Ring and two other co-defendants 
robbed a Wells Fargo armored van and killed the driver.102  Upon a search of 
Ring’s house, the police found a duffel bag containing more than $271,000 in 
cash.103 
At trial, the prosecutor submitted alternative theories of premeditated 
murder and felony murder.104  However, the evidence was insufficient “to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Ring] was a major participant in the 
robbery or that he actually murdered [the victim].”105  The jury was unable to 
convict Ring on the theory of premeditated murder but convicted him of first 
degree felony murder under the theory that the murder occurred during the 
course of an armed robbery (a felony).106 
Under Arizona’s sentencing scheme, the jury’s verdict subjected Ring to a 
maximum punishment of life imprisonment unless a judge made additional 
findings of aggravating circumstances in a separate sentencing hearing.107  The 
Arizona statute allowed the judge to determine at the end of the hearing 
whether any enumerated aggravating or mitigating circumstances were 
present.108  If the judge determined that at least one aggravating circumstance 
was present and not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances that would 
call for leniency, the judge could sentence the defendant to death.109 
Prior to Ring’s sentencing hearing, one of his co-defendants struck a deal 
with prosecutors in exchange for testimony in which he would name Ring as 
 
 99. Id.  (holding that the Sixth Amendment did not require a jury to find statutory 
aggravating factors that rendered a capital defendant eligible for the death penalty). 
 100. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). 
 101. Ring, 536 U.S. at 589. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 590. 
 104. Id. at 591. 
 105. Id. (quoting State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1152 (2001) (first alteration in original)). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Ring, 536 U.S. at 592. 
 108. Id. at 592–93. 
 109. Id. at 593. 
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the leader of the group and as the one who shot and killed the victim.110  The 
co-defendant testified at Ring’s sentencing hearing accordingly.111 
Because Ring was convicted under the felony murder theory and not 
premeditated murder, Ring was only eligible for the death penalty if 
Enmund/Tison findings were made.112  The judge found that Ring was the 
actual killer, that Ring was a major participant in the armed robbery, and that 
Ring exhibited a reckless disregard or indifference to human life.113  In making 
these findings, the judge cited the co-defendant’s testimony at the sentencing 
hearing.114After finding two aggravating factors and determining that Ring’s 
minimal criminal record did not call for leniency, the judge sentenced Ring to 
death.115 
In considering whether Arizona’s statute violated Ring’s Sixth 
Amendment right as set forth in Apprendi, the Court began its discussion with 
a telling statement: “Based solely on the jury’s verdict finding Ring guilty of 
first-degree felony murder, the maximum punishment he could have received 
was life imprisonment.”116  Arizona required that in order for the death penalty 
to be legally imposed, at least one aggravating factor needed to be found by a 
judge beyond a reasonable doubt.117  The rule in Apprendi specifically dealt 
with such schemes, did it not?  The answer, even to the most casual observer, 
would have to be, yes. 
Before answering the above question affirmatively, the Court had to deal 
with its prior ruling in Walton, which upheld the Arizona sentencing scheme at 
issue in Ring.118  The reasoning in Walton was based on the pre-Apprendi 
notion that because an aggravator was not an element of the crime of capital 
murder and merely placed a “substantive limit on sentencing,” such an 
aggravator or sentencing factor was not required to be found by a jury beyond 
a reasonable doubt.119 
The Court’s rationale for overruling Walton started with a historical 
analysis.  Picking up where Apprendi left off, the Court looked to Justice 
Stevens’s dissent in Walton for the historical context of the Sixth Amendment 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 594. 
 113. Ring, 536 U.S. at 594. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 594–95. 
 116. Id. at 597 (emphasis added). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990). 
 119. Id.  The Walton Court relied on the ruling in Cabana v. Bullock which stated that 
because the Enmund findings entailed no “element of the crime of capital murder” and only 
“place[d] a substantive limitation on sentencing” such findings were not required to be made by a 
jury.  Id. 
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right to a jury trial.  Justice Stevens argued that the “Sixth Amendment 
requires a jury determination of facts that must be established before the death 
penalty may be imposed.  Aggravators operate as statutory elements of capital 
murder under Arizona law because in their absence, [the death] sentence is 
unavailable.”120  Stevens pointed out that a jury in 1791 “had the power to 
determine not only whether the defendant was guilty of homicide but also the 
degree of the offense.”121  The jury’s right to determine issues such as the 
defendant’s eligibility for capital punishment and “which homicide defendants 
would be subject to capital punishment by making factual determinations . . . 
related to . . . assessments of the defendant’s state of mind” was unquestioned 
by the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights.122 
The Court moved on to the Apprendi ruling, reasserting the Court’s 
rationale that “the dispositive question is not one of form but of effect.”123  If a 
fact exposes the defendant to a “penalty exceeding the maximum he would 
receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone,” 
that fact, no matter how the state labeled it, must be found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.124  The Court concluded, “Because Arizona’s enumerated 
aggravating factors operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a 
greater offense,’ the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a 
jury.”125 
C. Blakely v. Washington:126 Apprendi’s Rule Solidified 
Shortly after the Supreme Court reaffirmed Apprendi’s rule in Ring, the 
Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington expressed the Court’s commitment 
to Apprendi and “the need to give intelligible content to the right of jury 
trial.”127  Although Blakely was not a capital felony murder case, its strong 
endorsement for the rule in Apprendi and Ring make it significant to this 
Comment’s discussion. 
The defendant in Blakely pled guilty to kidnapping his estranged wife.128  
The facts set forth in the plea exposed the defendant to a maximum sentence of 
fifty-three months.129  In compliance with Washington state law, a judge, 
 
 120. Ring, 536 U.S. at 599 (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 709 (1990) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)). 
 121. Id. (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 710–11 (1990)). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 602 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000)). 
 124. Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483). 
 125. Id. at 609 (Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494). 
 126. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 127. Id. at 305. 
 128. Id. at 298. 
 129. Id. 
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sitting without a jury, imposed an “exceptional sentence of 90 months after 
determining that the defendant acted with deliberate cruelty.”130 
Justice Scalia, relying on the rule set forth in Apprendi, added language 
that clarified what the rule meant by “statutory maximum.”131  He wrote that 
the “statutory maximum . . . is the maximum sentence a judge may impose 
solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the 
defendant.”132 This bright line characterization of the maximum sentence a 
judge may impose ensures that “the judge’s authority to sentence derives 
wholly from the jury’s verdict.”133  Given that the historical context of the rule 
in Apprendi went back to common law at the time of the birth of our Nation, 
Justice Scalia’s subtle, yet important, assertion “ensure[s] the [jury’s] control 
in the judiciary” which the Founders envisioned.134 
D. Cunningham v. California: Apprendi’s Reach Grows 
Recently, the Court added to the “intelligible content” of the Sixth 
Amendment by striking down California’s determinate sentencing law in 
Cunningham v. California.135  The Court held that because the law assigned 
the trial judge, and not the jury, the authority to find the facts that expose a 
defendant to an elevated “upper term sentence,” the determinate sentencing 
law violated the rule established in Apprendi.136 
California’s determinate sentencing law provided that a statute defining the 
criminal offense allowed for three terms of imprisonment: a lower, middle, and 
upper term. 137  The middle term was the default term the judge must impose 
unless aggravating or mitigating factors called for the upper or lower term to 
be imposed.138  The statute called for the trial judge to make the findings of 
aggravation or mitigation through a review of, among other things, the trial 
record, statements submitted by the parties, and additional evidence introduced 
at the sentencing hearing.139  California’s Judicial Counsel defined the phrase 
“circumstances in aggravation” to mean “facts which justify the imposition of 
the upper prison term.”140  Additionally, the statute prohibited the use of a “fact 
that is an element of the crime,” to impose the upper term.141 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 303. 
 132. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. 
 133. Id. at 306. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Cunningham v. California, 127 S.Ct. 856, 860 (2007). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 861. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 861-62. 
 140. Id. at 862 (emphasis added). 
 141. Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 862. 
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California argued that because the sentence enhancers were not essential to 
the determination of guilt, and that an aggravating circumstance need not be a 
fact, its determinate sentencing law did not violate the rule in Apprendi.142 
However, the Court rightly recognized California’s first argument as proving 
the opposite conclusion.143  The statute specifically did not allow elements of 
the charged offense to be used as aggravating circumstances.  Therefore, the 
judge could only consider facts that were not found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt as aggravating circumstances.144  “Because circumstances in 
aggravation are found by the judge, not the jury, and need only be established 
by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt, 
[California’s determinate sentencing law] violates Apprendi’s bright line 
rule.”145 
Blakely and Cunningham established two basic principles which further 
support the argument that Apprendi applies to Enmund/Tison findings.  First, 
Apprendi established a “bright line rule.”146  Once it is determined that a fact 
exposes a defendant to a penalty beyond the statutory maximum, “that should 
be the end of the matter.”147  Second, “the constitutionality of a state’s 
sentencing scheme [does not] turn on whether . . . it involves the type of fact 
finding ‘that traditionally has been performed by a judge.’”148 
III.  THE LOWER COURTS DO NOT OBLIGE: ENMUND AND TISON ARE LEFT OUT 
After the Court’s decision in Ring, the scope of its application was unclear.  
Questions about the Ring decision’s effect on a defendant’s right to a jury 
determination of the Enmund/Tison findings, however, did not linger long.  
Two lower court cases, State v. Ring (“Ring III”) and Brown v. State, are 
illustrative of the rationale used in holding that the rule in Apprendi and Ring 
does not apply to the Enmund/Tison findings.149 
To properly understand the rationale behind the lower courts’ denial to 
extend Ring to the Enmund/Tison findings, it is first necessary to examine the 
case on which their holdings rested, Cabana v. Bullock.150  Four years after the 
Court decided Enmund, it directly addressed whether an Enmund finding was 
 
 142. See id. at 868. 
 143. Id. at 868. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. (emphasis added). 
 146. Id. (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). 
 147. Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 868 (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 
(2003)). 
 148. Id. (quoting People v. Black, 113 P.3d 354, 542 (Cal. 2005)). 
 149. State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915 (Ariz. 2003) (en banc) (Ring III); Brown v. State, 67 P.3d 917 
(Okla. Crim. App. 2003). 
 150. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986). 
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required by the Sixth Amendment to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt.151 
A. Cabana v. Bullock: The Precedent 
In Cabana, the defendant was convicted of first degree capital murder 
based on a felony murder theory and sentenced to death as permitted by 
Mississippi statute.152  The trial record indicated that Bullock was not the 
actual killer and that the jury may have sentenced him to death without ever 
having considered whether he killed or intended to kill (findings required by 
Enmund).153 
However, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment did not require that 
the jury make the Enmund finding so long as it was made “by any court that 
has the power to find the facts and vacate the sentence.”154  The Court’s 
rationale was two pronged. 
First, it distinguished the Enmund finding as one of culpability and not an 
element of the offense.155  Because the finding concerned the level of 
culpability of the defendant and did not go to his guilt or innocence, the Court 
found the Enmund findings fundamentally different than those which are 
required by the Sixth Amendment to be found beyond a reasonable doubt.156  
To support its distinction, the Court noted that Enmund findings did not affect 
the “definition of any substantive offense, even a capital offense.”157  Based on 
this distinction, the Court placed the Enmund findings in a general class that 
goes to the decision as to whether a particular sentence is appropriate, also 
known as sentencing factors.158  The Sixth Amendment had not been held to 
encompass these types of findings.159 
Secondly, because Enmund did not “impose any particular form of 
procedure on the states[,] [a]t what precise point . . . a state chooses to make 
the Enmund determination is of little concern from the standpoint of the 
Constitution.”160  The Court reasoned that if a defendant who actually killed, 
intended to kill, or attempted to kill during the commission of a felony was 
sentenced to death and executed, his execution would not violate the Eighth 
Amendment no matter who made the requisite culpability determination.  
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 381. 
 153. Id. at 379, 384.  Because the jury did not make the requisite findings required by 
Enmund, the Fifth Circuit reversed Bullock’s death sentence.  Id. at 384. 
 154. Id. at 386. 
 155. Id. at 385. 
 156. Cabana, 474 U.S. at 385. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 385–86. 
 160. Id. at 386. 
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Therefore, it would likewise not matter who made the determination that the 
defendant lacked the requisite culpability.161 
While the Cabana decision only contemplated the requisite culpability 
determination as set forth in Enmund, the decision in Tison did not 
fundamentally alter the rationale of the arguments in Cabana.  Although the 
holding in Tison broadened the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, 
it was a direct descendant of Enmund.162  After the decision in Ring, Cabana 
was dusted off and trotted out. 
B. State v. Ring (Ring III): Dusting Cabana Off 
By April 2003, Ring’s case, consolidated with all capital cases, was on 
direct appeal from Superior Court to the Supreme Court of Arizona.163  The 
court addressed whether the Apprendi/Ring Sixth Amendment principles 
required a jury to make the Enmund/Tison findings.164  The Arizona Supreme 
Court held that the principles in Apprendi/Ring did not apply to findings.165  
The court relied on the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Cabana v. 
Bullock.166  The Cabana Court held that the Constitution did not require that a 
jury make a determination of the defendant’s level of culpability in capital 
felony murder cases.167  The Arizona court was particularly taken with the 
language in Cabana that the ruling in Enmund did not establish any “new 
elements of the crime that must be found by a jury.”168 Rejecting Ring’s 
applicability to the Enmund/Tison findings, the Arizona court reformulated the 
determinative question in Apprendi and Ring.169  The question, as it applies to 
the Enmund/Tison elements is not whether the state met its burden with regard 
to the defendant’s culpable mental state, but whether the defendant’s culpable 
mental state is such that the government can administer the death penalty 
consistently with the Eighth Amendment.170  The Arizona Supreme Court 
distinguished the Enmund/Tison findings from substantive elements of a 
greater offense by characterizing the Enmund/Tison findings as a “judicially 
crafted instrument used to measure proportionality between a defendant’s 
criminal culpability and the sentence imposed.”171 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. See supra text accompanying notes 64–65. 
 163. State v. Ring (Ring III), 65 P.3d 915, 916 (Ariz. 2003) (en banc). 
 164. Id. at 944. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 945. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Ring III, 65 P.3d at 945. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 945–46. 
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C. Brown v. State: A Different Take, the Same Result 
In another 2003 case, Brown v. State,172 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals issued a similar holding to Ring.  The court held that “[a]fter Ring, the 
Enmund/Tison determination may still be made by a court, even though a jury 
must make the factual finding of aggravating circumstances.”173  The court 
reasoned that the “Enmund/Tison determination does not make a murderer 
eligible for the death penalty.  It is a limiting factor, not an enhancing 
factor.”174  The court concluded that once a defendant is eligible for the death 
penalty, the Enmund/Tison findings can be made by any tribunal.175 
IV.  ANALYZING WHAT THE LOWER COURTS HAVE WRONG 
In holding that the Sixth Amendment does not require a jury to make the 
Enmund/Tison findings, the lower courts are mistaken in four important 
respects.  First, the holdings in each case mischaracterize the function of the 
Enmund/Tison factors.  Second, the holdings fail to consider the vital role of 
the jury in imposing punishments based on a retributive justification.176  Third, 
the holdings ignore the historical rationale and purpose on which the Apprendi, 
Ring, Blakely, and Cunningham courts based the rule.  Finally, the support the 
lower courts draw from Cabana is misplaced in light of the opinion in Ring. 
A. Enmund/Tison Factors at Work 
An examination of how the Enmund/Tison factors actually function is 
essential to the argument that they, like the aggravating circumstances in 
Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely, be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt as 
required by the reasoning in Apprendi.  This examination must first be put in 
the context of the facts that the Court has already ruled facts which subject a 
defendant to a punishment beyond the statutory maximum. 
In Apprendi, the Court found that a fact which related to the defendant’s 
particular intent in committing the crime and exposed the defendant to a 
punishment that exceeded the statutory maximum must be found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.177  To do so, the Court introduced the instrumental 
test in determining which facts the Sixth Amendment requires be found by a 
 
 172. Brown v. State, 67 P.3d 917 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003).  Although the defendant in Brown 
v. State was not a “non-triggerman” defendant, the court’s discussion and rationale for the 
Enmund/Tison factors applied to non-triggermen defendants as well. 
 173. Id. at 920. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. The retributive theory is the only justification offered in either Enmund or Tison for 
imposing the death penalty on felony-murder defendants who did not actually kill.  See infra Part 
IV.2. 
 177. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
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jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  The question was “one not of form but of 
effect—does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment 
than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?”178 The Court found that the 
trial judge’s determination that Apprendi’s crime was motivated by racial bias 
and that his actions were intended to intimidate failed the newly created 
standard.179  The Court reasoned that in order to make the finding that 
Apprendi committed his crime with the purpose to intimidate the trial judge 
had to make a particular factual finding regarding Apprendi’s mens rea.180  
Because the New Jersey hate crime statute targeted a particular mens rea, “the 
defendant’s intent in committing a crime is perhaps as close as one might hope 
to come to a core criminal offense ‘element.’”181 
Similarly, the Blakely trial court found, after the defendant pled guilty to 
second degree kidnapping, that the defendant acted with deliberate cruelty, a 
statutory aggravating factor, and sentenced the defendant to thirty-seven 
months beyond the statutory maximum allowed by the defendant’s guilty 
plea.182  This aggravating circumstance required the judge to consider the 
surrounding circumstances of the offense and make a determination as to the 
mens rea of the defendant when he committed the crime, namely that the 
defendant acted with deliberate or intentional cruelty.  This factual 
determination, the Court held, violated the rule in Apprendi.183 
The Enmund/Tison findings require a similar inquiry into the defendant’s 
mens rea.  For a non-triggerman capital murder defendant to be sentenced to 
death, he or she must have been a major participant in the crime and exhibited 
a reckless disregard for human life.184  Thus, these factual inquiries expose a 
defendant to a greater sentence than constitutionally allowed in their absence.  
Although the Enmund/Tison determination is required by a constitutional 
proportionality requirement, and not by statute, it hardly seems logical that 
because the Enmund/Tison findings go to a constitutional limit, and not a 
statutory limit, they should be analyzed differently.  Those states permitting 
capital punishment for non-triggermen felony murder defendants may only 
target those defendants who exhibit a particular mens rea.  For defendants who 
did not kill but are charged with first degree murder based on the felony 
murder theory, the death penalty cannot be imposed unless they are found to 
have been a major participant in the crime and to have exhibited a reckless 
indifference to human life. 
 
 178. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000). 
 179. Id. at 492. 
 180. Id. at 492–93. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299–300 (2004). 
 183. Id. at 305. 
 184. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
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The Court in Ring applied the Apprendi rule to aggravating circumstances 
that exposed defendants found guilty of first degree murder to the death 
penalty.185  Ring was convicted of first degree murder.  After the verdict, the 
judge found two statutory aggravating circumstances which exposed Ring to 
the death penalty.186  Because the Arizona statute required a judge make these 
findings before a defendant could be sentenced to death, the Court held the 
scheme violated the rule in Apprendi and the Sixth Amendment.187  Arizona’s 
statutory aggravating circumstances were created in response to the Supreme 
Court’s holdings in Furman and Gregg that the Constitution requires the death 
penalty be administered in a way that is not capricious.188  The aggravating 
factors had to narrow the class of persons subject to imposition of the death 
penalty.189  The Court cited Thomas’s concurring opinion in Apprendi to 
explain the function of the aggravators: “If the legislature defines some core 
crime and then provides for increasing the punishment of that crime upon a 
finding of some aggravating fact[,] . . . the core crime and the aggravating fact 
together constitute an aggravated crime.”190 
It is difficult to see how the Enmund/Tison findings function differently 
than the aggravating circumstances in Ring.  The findings narrow the class of 
citizens (felony murder defendants who did not kill) who may be subjected to 
the death penalty.  Unless found to be a major participant in the crime and to 
have exhibited a reckless disregard for human life, a defendant who did not kill 
or intend to kill cannot sentenced to death.191  If a state legislature defines first 
degree murder to include felony murder, but does not require a finding of the 
Enmund/Tison elements, these elements still must be found in order to 
sentence the defendant to death.192  A first degree murder verdict does not 
expose a non-triggerman felony murder defendant to the death penalty just as a 
first degree murder conviction does not expose the defendant to the death 
penalty absent a finding of aggravating circumstances.  Simply because 
aggravators are not enumerated in a statute does not take away from the role 
they play in a capital sentence for a non-triggerman defendant. 
 
 185. See generally Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 186. Id. at 594–95. 
 187. Id. at 589. 
 188. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 606 (2002). 
 189. Zant v. Stephens, U.S. 862, 877 (1983). 
 190. Ring, 536 U.S. at 605 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 501 (2000) 
(Thomas, J. concurring)). 
 191. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
 192. Id. 
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B. Theories of Punishment: Felony Murder and the Jury 
Although theories of punishment do not occupy an expressly stated role in 
the reasoning of the Apprendi, Ring, Blakely, or Cunningham opinions, 
consideration of the role these theories play does have an impact of the 
question of whom should make the Enmund/Tison determination.  While the 
utilitarian principle of deterrence is often cited as a justification for the death 
penalty,193 it has little to do with the decisions in Enmund and Tison.  The 
rationale for both decisions was based on an Eighth Amendment 
proportionality analysis, which cited retribution as “acceptable goal of 
punishment.”194  Moreover, Justice Breyer argued in his concurring opinion in 
Ring that the Eighth Amendment requires jury sentencing in capital cases 
because the only justification for the imposition of the death penalty is 
retributive and that the jury is unique in its advantage “in determining, in a 
particular case, whether capital punishment will serve that end.”195 
The retributive theory of punishment is often criticized as a sort of raw 
vengeance masked by philosophy.196  The underlying tenet to the theory is that 
“punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting 
another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but 
must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is 
inflicted has committed a crime.”197  The retributive theory is founded in 
natural and moral law dating back to the Bible, which viewed any injustice 
caused by another as an upset to the natural order.198  Punishment, therefore, 
arises out of the need to restore that natural order, and “only the Law of 
retribution can determine exactly the kind and degree of punishment.”199 
Punishment based on retributive principles must be carefully calibrated to 
the offender’s moral culpability.  An offender’s mental state is an essential 
element in determining the seriousness of an offense.200  A criminal act that is 
 
 193. David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of Felony Murder, 8 HARV. J.L. & P. 
POL’Y 359, 369 (1985). 
 194. See generally Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).  In fact, Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion in Tison is devoid of any discussion of the utilitarian principle of deterrence as a 
justification for imposing the death penalty on a non-triggerman capital defendant. 
 195. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (dismissing the 
deterrence effect of the death penalty based on several empirical studies which show little to no 
deterrent effect resulting from the death penalty). 
 196. George Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 SW. U. L. REV. 413, 426–28 (1981). 
 197. Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law, in CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 
37–38 (West Group 2d ed., 1999). 
 198. Fletcher, supra note 205, at 426. 
 199. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, in CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT: 
CASES, MATERIALS, AND READINGS IN CRIMINAL LAW 188 (Matthew Bender, 3d ed., 2001). 
 200. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (2002) (referencing Locket v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 
(1978)). 
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done more purposefully is more serious and therefore deserves a more serious 
punishment.201 
In the context of the death penalty, and in particular felony murder 
defendants who did not actually kill the victim, retributive punishment is 
imposed by the jury acting as the moral compass of the community.202  The 
jury is “more attuned to ‘the community’s moral sensibility.’”203  The decision 
that a defendant be sentenced to death is an “expression of the community’s 
belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity 
that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.”204 
If it is the jury’s role to mete out retributive justice, it can only perform its 
function if allowed to consider all facts and circumstances that are required to 
expose the defendant to the ultimate punishment.  If a single government 
official makes any necessary factual determination whether an aggravating 
circumstance, or a constitutionally required factual determination such as the 
Enmund/Tison findings, the mechanism of justice is short-circuited.  A jury 
that does not take into consideration the culpability of the defendant, which is 
the exact purpose of the Enmund/Tison findings, cannot make a proper 
determination as to whether the only adequate response to the defendant’s 
conduct is the penalty of death. 
C. The Historical Rationale and Purpose of Apprendi, Ring and Blakely 
The historical role of the jury in criminal prosecutions provided the 
foundation for the holdings in the Apprendi/Ring/Blakely line of cases.  When 
the same analysis of the jury’s traditional role is applied to the Enmund/Tison 
findings, the same conclusion emerges: because Enmund/Tison findings are 
facts which expose a non-triggerman to the death penalty, the jury, not the 
judge, must find them beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Court in Apprendi anchored its extension of the Sixth Amendment 
right to a trial by jury in the role that the jury played in criminal proceedings 
historically.205  Traditionally, the jury made a determination of all facts 
relevant to the guilt of the defendant.  Once the guilty verdict was reached, the 
judge had little sentencing discretion.206  “The judgment, though pronounced 
or awarded by the judges, is not their determination or sentence, but the 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615–16 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 203. Id. at 615 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 481 
(1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 204. Id. at 616 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and 
Stevens, J. joint opinion)). 
 205. Apprendi v. New Jersey 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000). 
 206. Id. at 479. 
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determination and sentence of the law.”207  Most importantly, at the time of the 
Nation’s founding, the conceptual distinction between an element of the 
offense and a sentencing factor did not exist.208  The jury was charged with 
finding “all the facts and circumstances which constitute the offense.”209  
Therefore, those facts that later became known as sentencing factors, such as 
New Jersey’s hate crime statute in Apprendi or statutory aggravating 
circumstances in Ring, were committed to the jury to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt.210  The Court ruled as much two years after Apprendi.211  Citing Justice 
Stevens’s dissent in Walton v. Arizona, the Court in Ring acknowledged that if 
the question of whether aggravators operated as statutory elements of capital 
murder “had been posed in 1791, when the Sixth Amendment became law, the 
answer would have been clear [because] by that time . . . the jury’s role in 
finding facts that would determine a homicide defendant’s eligibility for 
capital punishment was particularly well established.”212 
The reasoning in Blakely places the capstone on the revival of the 
historical right to a jury trial.  The Court referenced several sources from the 
Nation’s founding to place the role of the jury in its proper context.213  Just as 
the founders sought to protect the peoples’ control in the executive and 
legislative branches, they envisioned the jury as representing the peoples’ 
“rightful controul in the judicial department.”214 
Against this historical backdrop, the assertion in Cabana that because an 
“Eighth Amendment violation can be adequately remedied by any court that 
has the power to find facts and vacate the sentence[,] [a]t what precise 
point . . . a State chooses to make the Enmund[/Tison] determination is of little 
 
 207. Id. at 479–80 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES 396). 
 208. Id. at 478. 
 209. Id. (quoting JOHN FREDERICK ARCHBOLD, PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL 
CASES 44 (15th ed. 1862) (emphasis added). 
 210.  
Where a statute annexes a higher degree of punishment to a common-law felony, if 
committed under particular circumstances, . . .  the indictment . . . must expressly charge 
[the offence] to have been committed under those circumstances, and must state the 
circumstances with certainty and precision.  [If] the prosecutor prove [sic] the felony to 
have been committed, but fail in proving it to have been committed under the 
circumstances specified in the statute, the defendant shall be convicted of the common-
law felony only.   
Id. at 480–81 (quoting JOHN FREDERICK ARCHBOLD, PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL 
CASES 51 (15th ed. 1862)). 
 211. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). 
 212. Id. at 599 (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 709–10 (1990) (Stevens, J. 
dissenting)). 
 213. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004). 
 214. Id. at 306 (quoting LETTER XV BY THE FEDERAL FARMER (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2 
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 320 (H. Storing ed. 1981)). 
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concern from the standpoint of the Constitution” does not pass muster.215  The 
precise point at which the Enmund/Tison determination is made may be of 
little concern as far as the Eighth Amendment goes;216 however, it is crucial to 
whether the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury has been 
violated.  Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Cabana touches on this point.  
“Enmund[/Tison factors establish] a constitutionally required factual predicate 
for the valid imposition of the death penalty;” without these findings “a case 
may not pass into that area in which the death penalty is authorized by the 
Eighth Amendment.”217  This is a factual determination which increases a 
defendant’s maximum punishment from life to death.  Based on the Supreme 
Court’s decisions and reasoning in Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely, the answer 
can only be that the jury alone has the power to make this determination.  The 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is “no mere procedural formality, but a 
fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure” that ensures 
the people’s “control in the judiciary.”218 
D. Retiring Cabana v. Bullock 
Neither of the opinions in Ring III or Brown devotes much analysis to the 
question of whether the Enmund/Tison elements need to be found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt as required by the Sixth Amendment.219  The Court 
in each case was content to invoke principles asserted in Cabana and move on 
to hold that the Sixth Amendment holding of Ring does not extend to the 
Eighth Amendment Enmund/Tison factors.220  If these Courts were to consider 
the question thoroughly, they would be obligated to come out differently. 
The Court in Ring III relied directly on Cabana’s holding that the “federal 
constitution does not require a jury to determine a defendant’s level of 
culpability in capital felony murder cases.”221  The Court quoted Cabana’s 
reasoning that “‘Enmund[/Tison] does not affect the state’s definition of any 
substantive offense’” but only prohibits capital punishment on a class of 
persons who are guilty of capital murder under the state’s definition of the 
 
 215. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986). 
 216. However, this statement may not be entirely accurate.  In both Enmund v. Florida and 
Tison v. Arizona, the Court closely examined jury verdicts and the reluctance of jurors to sentence 
homicide defendants who did not kill or intend to kill to death in its analysis as to whether the 
imposition of death penalty on such defendants violated the Eighth Amendment.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 42–44, 63. 
 217. Cabana, 474 U.S. at 396 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 218. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305–06. 
 219. State v. Ring (Ring III), 65 P.3d 915, 944-45 (Ariz. 2003) (en banc); Brown v. State, 67 
P.3d 917, 920 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003). 
 220. Ring III, 65 P.3d at 945; Brown, 67 P.3d at 920. 
 221. Ring III, 65 P.3d at 945. 
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crime.222  Because the Enmund/Tison findings do not go to the question of 
“whether the state has met its burden but whether, given a defendant’s culpable 
mental state, the government can impose capital punishment consistent with 
the Eighth Amendment[],” the Court held, the distinction created in Cabana 
“[withstood] Apprendi and Ring.”223 
This “distinction” that Cabana created between elements of the offense224 
and the Enmund/Tison findings, however, is no longer intelligible.  In 1986, 
when Cabana was decided, the Court subscribed to the understanding that a 
state’s labeling a fact a sentencing factor rather than a substantive element of 
the offense controlled whether the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury 
attached to such a fact.225 
Apprendi shifted this understanding, and since its decision has been handed 
down, the Court has been endeavoring to “give intelligible content to the Sixth 
Amendment right of jury trial.”226  This “intelligible content” began with 
Apprendi’s holding that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”227  Central to the Court’s reasoning in Apprendi 
was a desire to reign in a state’s ability to define away constitutionally required 
facts.228  The Court clarified this goal four years later, stating that “the 
statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge 
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or 
admitted by the defendant.”229 
Ring III was decided before Blakely clarified Apprendi and Ring.  So, at 
the time, the superficial distinction between the substantive elements of a 
crime, which must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and the 
Enmund/Tison findings, which are sentencing considerations, was plausible.230  
 
 222. Id.  (quoting Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 385 (1986)). 
 223. Id. 
 224. The Court viewed aggravating factors as “substantive elements of the offense.” Ring III, 
65 P.3d at 945. 
 225. Apprendi v. New Jersey was a marked departure from previous Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  Prior cases allowed the states much latitude in defining what elements of an 
offense were and what were sentencing factors that justified either a more lenient or harsher 
punishment.  See supra text accompanying notes 71–74. 
 226. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004). 
 227. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 489–90.  Ring v. Arizona extended this exact 
holding to aggravating factors for capital murder cases.  Id. at 490, 494. 
 228. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 486. 
 229. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. 
 230. However, the Arizona Court could have come to the same conclusion based on the 
wording of the controlling question in Apprendi—“does the required finding expose the 
defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?”  Apprendi, 
530 U.S. at 494.  The Court in Blakely held the same, only more emphatically.  Blakely, 542 U.S. 
at 296, 303. 
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However, if the Enmund/Tison findings are placed into the intelligible content 
of the Sixth Amendment as described in Blakely, it is clear that the 
“distinction” that Cabana and Ring III contemplate disappears.  If a jury finds 
a non-triggerman defendant guilty of first degree murder, without finding that 
the defendant intended to kill or was recklessly indifferent to human life and 
was a major participant in the murder, then presumably the judge would have 
to make the Enmund/Tison findings before the death penalty could be 
imposed.231  Quite simply, this scenario would violate the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt of all 
essential facts for the imposition of a punishment under the 
Apprendi/Ring/Blakely analysis.  In fact, until Ring, statutory aggravating 
factors were treated in the same manner as the Enmund/Tison findings.232  It 
does not matter whether the Enmund/Tison findings are labeled as substantive 
elements because the controlling question is “not one of form, but of effect.”233 
Another troubling aspect of Cabana’s reasoning is its assertion that an 
“Eighth Amendment violation can be adequately remedied by any court that 
has the power to find the facts and vacate the sentence.  At what precise point 
in its criminal process a State chooses to make the Enmund determination is of 
little concern from the stand point of the Constitution.”234  This, indeed, is a 
puzzling statement.  Essentially, the Court did not see a problem with allowing 
a jury to deliver a guilty verdict and declare that the defendant is unfit to live 
“without first considering his personal responsibility and moral guilt.”235  It 
hardly seems logical or judicially efficient to allow a jury to return a verdict for 
death without informing that jury of all constitutionally required facts 
necessary to impose the death penalty on a defendant. Allowing a judge or 
appellate court to make the requisite Enmund/Tison findings pushes these 
constitutionally required determinations as to whether a person may live or die 
to the position of a “judicial afterthought.”236 
The court in Brown v. State took a slightly different path to holding that the 
Sixth Amendment does not require that the Enmund/Tison elements be found 
by a jury.237  However, as in Ring III, the court’s reasoning was based on an 
untenable distinction between the function of aggravating circumstances and 
 
 231. As was the case in Ring v. Arizona, “The judge recognized that Ring was eligible for the 
death penalty only if he was [the] actual killer or if he was major participant in the armed robbery 
that led to the killing and exhibited a reckless disregard or indifference to human life.”  536 U.S. 
584, 594 (2002).  The judge concluded that Ring was the actual killer and a major participant in 
the armed robbery “which carries with it a grave risk of death.”  Id. 
 232. See generally Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). 
 233. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494. 
 234. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986). 
 235. Id. at 397 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 236. Id. at 394. 
 237. Brown v. State, 67 P.3d 917, 920 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003). 
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the Enmund/Tison findings. The main difference between the two, the court 
reasoned, was that the “Enmund/Tison determination does not make a murder 
eligible for the death penalty,” but that it only serves as a limiting factor, not an 
enhancing factor such as aggravating circumstances.238  The court went on to 
state that only after the defendant has been found eligible for the death penalty 
is the Enmund/Tison finding relevant.239 
This distinction, too, can no longer said to be true, if it ever was at all.  The 
court could have easily said that a defendant is not eligible for the death 
penalty unless the Enmund/Tison findings are made.240  In fact, when the Court 
in Ring described the Arizona trial court’s findings after Ring was found guilty 
of first degree murder by a jury, it stated that “the judge recognized that Ring 
was eligible for the death penalty only if” the Enmund/Tison findings were 
made.241  The language the court in Brown uses seems more appropriate for a 
discussion weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the 
sentencing phase.242  However, the Enmund/Tison factors are not mitigators; 
they are findings of fact that are constitutionally required before a capital 
defendant who did not kill may be put to death.243 
Additionally, strict adherence to the distinction that the court in Brown 
announced allows form to take precedence over effect, which is exactly what 
the Courts in Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely were trying to avoid.  Because a 
non-triggerman defendant cannot be sentenced to death unless found to be 
recklessly indifferent to human life and a major participant in the felony, this 
factual determination is one that increases the maximum penalty that may be 
imposed.  If a jury does not make this determination in its verdict, a judge must 
make this finding before imposing the death sentence, which, as stated before, 
is not permitted under Apprendi/Ring/Blakely.  The labeling of the 
Enmund/Tison finding as one of limitation and not enhancement has no bearing 
on its actual function. 
One last concern that both the Ring III court (indirectly) and the Brown 
court addressed is the fact that the Ring holding only extended Apprendi’s 
holding to statutory aggravating factors.244  How, then, can the holding in Ring 
 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. In Zant v. Stephens, the Court noted that absent the finding of a statutory aggravating 
circumstance, “[a] case may not pass . . . into that area in which the death penalty is authorized.”  
462 U.S. 862, 872 (1983). 
 241. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 594 (2002) (emphasis added). 
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judges . . . taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender—in 
imposing a judgment with the range prescribe by the statute.”). 
 243. See supra text accompanying note 68. 
 244. See State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 945-46 (Ariz. 2003) (en banc); Brown v. State, 67 P.3d 
917, 919-20 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003). 
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be said to encompass Enmund/Tison findings, which are required by the Eighth 
Amendment proportionality principles?  Perhaps the main (and not so 
glamorous) reason is that the claim in Ring was narrowly crafted and it simply 
did not include the Enmund/Tison determination.  This explanation, however, 
should not be dispositive of the issue.  Justice Scalia gave some insight into the 
true nature of the inquiry in his concurring opinion in Ring.  He wrote, “the 
fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is 
that all facts essential to the imposition of the level of punishment that the 
defendant receives—whether the statute calls them elements of the offense, 
sentencing factors, or Mary Jane—must be found by the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”245  This formulation of the Sixth Amendment right begs the 
question: what if the legislature does not include the essential fact in the statute 
at all, but the finding of the fact is required by the Eighth Amendment?  Does 
the Sixth Amendment right vanish as to this fact?  Hardly.  In its capital 
punishment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has deemed as an Eighth 
Amendment constitutional requirement a channeling and limiting of the 
sentencer’s discretion in imposing the death penalty.246  Legislatures responded 
to these limitations by incorporating aggravating factors that sufficiently 
narrow the class of eligible defendants, which Ring required to be found by a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.247  As discussed earlier, the Enmund/Tison 
determination functions in the same way as the statutory aggravating factors.248  
A state legislature can no more avoid the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee 
by naming an aggravating factor “Mary Jane” than it can by simply omitting it 
from the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
A truism passes into the realm of meaningless cliché when it is repeated 
without one’s giving thought to its significance or meaning.  When it comes to 
a non-triggerman defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination 
beyond a reasonable doubt of any fact that exposes him or her to a sentence 
that exceeds the statutory maximum, how different is death?  If and when the 
Supreme Court revisits this issue, it should apply Apprendi’s bright line rule 
and that should be the end of the matter.  The Enmund/Tison culpability 
findings function much like the facts in Apprendi and Blakely and the 
aggravating circumstances in Ring and Cunningham–they increase the 
maximum penalty a non-triggerman felony murder defendant could receive in 
their absence.  Apprendi and Ring started the Sixth Amendment revival.  Cases 
 
 245. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 246. Id. at 606 (majority opinion). 
 247. Id. at 606–07. 
 248. Supra Part VI.1. 
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such as Blakely and Cunningham have strengthened it.  All that is left is for the 
Court to bring the Enmund/Tison findings under the tent. 
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